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FIDUCIARY SHIELD WILL NOT BAR ASSERTION OF PERSONAL
JURISDICTION OVER NONRESIDENT OWNER OF
CORPORATE SHELL
Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. Miller, 664 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1981)
In Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. Miller,' the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals distinguished its test for piercing the corporate veil' from the
criteria for applying the fiduciary shield doctrine 3 in holding that the
mere finding of a corporate shell, without a showing of fraudulent use,
is sufficient to subject the shell corporation's owner to personal jurisdic-
tion4 in the forum in which the corporation has transacted business.'
Plaintiff, Marine Midland Bank, N.A., brought a diversity action 6
1. 664 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1981).
2. "Piercing the corporate veil" is an equitable exception to the general rule that the corpo-
rate entity will not be disregarded. H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 146
(2d ed. 1970). "Where the corporation has been used as an 'instrumentality' or 'adjunct' of the
parent .... the 'corporate veil' will be 'pierced' and the persons behind it will be exposed to the
bright light of liability." N. LATrIN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 14 (2d ed. 1971). See also I
W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 41-41.3 (rev. perm. ed.
1975 & Supp. 1982) (discussion of federal and state courts' criteria for disregarding the corporate
entity).
For an early discussion of the doctrine, see Wormser, Piercing the Veil of Corporate Entity, 12
COLUM. L. REV. 496 (1912).
3. The fiduciary shield doctrine defeats the assertion of personal jurisdiction over a nonresi-
dent corporate fiduciary predicated upon his corporate activities in the forum. United States v.
Montreal Trust Co., 358 F.2d 239 (2d Cir. 1966); Rene Boas & Assocs. v. Vernier, 22 A.D.2d 561,
257 N.Y.S.2d 487 (1965). For a discussion and critique of the doctrine, see Sponsler, Jurisdiction
Over the Corporate Agent: The Fiduciary Shield, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 349 (1978); Comment,
Chancellor v. Lawrence: Minimum Contacts and the Fiduciary Shield Doctrine, 15 J. MAR. L. REV.
251 (1982).
4. Constitutional due process requires that the court have jurisdiction over the parties and
the subject matter of the suit. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). Personal, or in personam
jurisdiction, is the power of the court "to summon a defendant before it to adjudicate the claim
against him." 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1064 (1969 &
Supp. 1981). See generally C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra, at §§ 1063-1069 (historical develop-
ment of personal jurisdiction).
5. Among the statutes which form the basis for personal jurisdiction, New York's long-arm
statute, N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 302(a) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1981), provides that courts "may
exercise personal jurisdiction over any nondomiciliary, or his executor or administrator, who in
person or through an agent: 1. transacts any business within the state; or 2. commits a tortious act
within the state .. " There is a large body of law on what satisfies the "transacting business"
requirement. See 7B N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW §§ 72-83 (McKinney 1972), 29-103 (Supp. 1981).
6. Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. Miller, 512 F. Supp. 602 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). The amount in
controversy exceeded $10,000; the plaintiff's offices were in New York and the defendant was a
resident of West Virginia. Zd at 603. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (1976).
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 61:623
against defendant James W. Miller for negligent misrepresentation.
The cause of action was Miller's allegedly tortious conduct7 as presi-
dent of Miller & Associates, a coal consulting firm that advised Marine
Midland on the future of a mining investment.8 Claiming that his con-
tacts with the forum were made solely in his corporate capacity,9 Miller
moved, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), t° to dis-
miss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction."I In opposition to
7. Under New York law, commercial misrepresentation made in expectation of reliance is
potentially tortious conduct within the purview of New York's long-arm statute. White v.
Guarente, 43 N.Y.2d 356, 372 N.E.2d 315, 401 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1977).
8. In 1977, a group of investors sought to borrow approximately $6,000,000 from Marine
Midland Bank, N.A. to finance a coal mining project. Miller & Associates prepared a feasibility
report (the "Miller Report") and submitted it to the bank. The Miller Report stated that the
proposed mine would yield nearly 27 million tons of coal of commercially acceptable quality.
James Miller made at least two visits to the bank's New York offices, where he presented and
confirmed the report's findings and conclusions. Marine Midland retained a second coal consult-
ing firm, Keplinger & Associates, which confirmed the Miller Report's findings and conclusion.
The bank subsequently loaned the investors more than $9,000,000. In March 1979 Keplinger
informed Marine Midland that both consulting firms had overstated the quality and quantity of
the project's coal resources. Almost no coal could be economically mined and, consequently, the
investors were unable to repay Marine Midland. 664 F.2d at 900-901.
In a separate action commenced in August 1979, Marine Midland sued Keplinger & Associates
and Miller & Associates. Marine Midland Bank v. Keplinger & Assocs., Inc., 488 F. Supp. 699
(S.D.N.Y. 1980).
9. Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. Miller, 512 F. Supp. 602, 603-04, 604 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
See also Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. Miller, 664 F.2d 899, 901 (2d Cir. 1981) (acted solely in
corporate capacity).
10. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) provides in relevant part: "Every defense in law or fact, to a
claim for relief in any pleading ... shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is
required, except that the following defenses may . . . be made by motion: . . . (2) lack of
jurisdiction .. "
11. See supra note 4. The Supreme Court has set the criteria for subjecting nonresidents to
personal jurisdiction. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980);
Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). In
International Shoe the Court held:
[Diue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in per-
sonam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum
contracts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional no-
tions of fair play and substantial justice."
326 U.S. at 316. See generally 2 J. Mooan, MooRE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 4.25 (2d ed. 1982)
(jurisdiction to be governed by state standards as limited under due process clause of fourteenth
amendment).
Consistent with due process requirements, a state may enact a long-arm statute which will au-
thorize the assertion of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant for a cause of action
which arose through the defendant's activities in the forum. Eg., Elkhart Eng'g Corp. v. Dornier
Werke, 343 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1965). Cf. Hess v. Pawlowski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (Constitution
permits exercise of jurisdiction over nonresidents for torts committed on forum state's highways
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this motion, Marine Midland presented deposition testimony and sev-
eral affidavits to support its contention that Miller & Associates was
Miller's alter ego, and that his corporate activity in the forum should
thus form the predicate for subjecting him to personal jurisdiction.12
The district court granted Miller's motion to dismiss.' 3 The court
found that Miller's activities in the forum were undertaken strictly on
behalf of the corporation. Consequently, the fiduciary shield doctrine
prevented the court from asserting personal jurisdiction predicated on
these activities.' 4 The court rejected Marine Midland's theory that the
corporation's activities should be attributed to Miller himself for the
purpose of asserting jurisdiction. The court reasoned that in the ab-
sence of any showing of fraud, proof of a corporate shell does not sat-
isfy its requirements for piercing the corporate veil.'
5
On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, and held.
the fiduciary shield doctrine will not defeat the assertion of personal
per nonresident motorist statutes). However, the Court in International Shoe recognized that con-
tinuous corporate activity within the forum may be found so substantial as to justify suit against it
on a cause of action that arose outside the state. 326 U.S. 310, 318.
Ncw York's long-arm statute, 7B N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 302 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1981),
authorizes New York courts to assert personal jurisdiction over nondomiciliaries on the basis of
certain acts. The New York legislature chose not to take full advantage of the constitutional reach
of long-arm jurisdiction. New York Advisory Comm. Rep. (N.Y. Legis. Doc., 1958, No. 13).
Generally, New York limits its exercise of personal jurisdiction by requiring that nonresident
defendants' minimum contacts be related to the cause of action in the suit. 7B N.Y. Civ. PRAC.
LAW § 302 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1981). For a thorough analysis of § 302, see Longines-
Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 443, 450-52, 209 N.E.2d 68, 71-72,
261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 13-15. See also 7B N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 59-156 (McKinney 1972), § 29-102
(Supp. 1981) (annotation of cases interpreting § 302); Homburger, The Reach of New York's Long-
Arm Statute: Today and Tomorrow, 15 BUFFALO L. REv. 61, 61-62 (1965) (origins of§ 302). See
generally 2 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 4.41-1 (2d ed. 1982) (historical develop-
ment of long-arm statutes); 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 4, at §§ 1063-1069 (1967 &
Supp. 1982) (discussion of personal jurisdiction development).
12. 664 F.2d at 901. The affidavits alleged that Miller & Associates had not maintained the
corporate form because contract formation and performance, billing procedures and services were
conducted in conjunction with other businesses owned entirely by Miller himself. There was evi-
dence that Miller & Associates was seriously undercapitalized, and that it "was in effect nothing
more than a telephone number and stationery." Id at 901.
13. 512 F. Supp. at 602, 603.
14. Id at 604. The fiduciary shield doctrine is a judicial interpretation of the legislature's
intended reach of the long-arm statute. See United States v. Montreal Trust Co., 358 F.2d 239,
242 (2d Cir. 1966). See also supra note 3. The Iowa Supreme Court, however, has found the
fiduciary shield doctrine to be a due process limitation on the exercise ofjurisdiction. See Iowa ex
rel Miller v. Internal Energy Management Corp., 324 N.W.2d 707, 711 (Iowa 1982). But see supra
note 11.
15. 512 F. Supp. at 604.
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jurisdiction over a nonresident corporate employee predicated upon his
activities in the forum when the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing
that the corporation is the defendant's "shell". A showing of fraud,
which the Second Circuit has held is a necessary predicate for piercing
the corporate veil, relates to the more onerous finding of liability and
not to the threshold issue of jurisdiction.' 6
The law permits individuals to incorporate their activities for the
very purpose of escaping personal liability, 7 on the theory that society
would not receive the benefits of corporate activity if this qualified
grant of immunity were not available to encourage and facilitate the
establishment of certain enterprises.'" Piercing the corporate veil is an
equitable exception to the general principle that the acts of a corpora-
tion will not subject its shareholders to individual liability. 9 In Taylor
v. Standard Gas & Electric Co. ,2 the Supreme Court held that the gen-
eral grant of shareholder immunity from liability is withheld when it
"would work fraud or injustice."'" In Anderson v. Abbott,22 the Court
held that it would pierce the corporate veil upon a showing of fraud,23
and suggested that inadequate capitalization of the corporAtion in rela-
16. 664 F.2d at 904. See infra notes 19-33, 88 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349 (1944); Kirno Hill Corp. v. Holt, 618 F.2d 982
(2d Cir. 1980); Zubik v. Zubik, 384 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 988 (1968);
Bartle v. Home Owners Coop., 309 N.Y. 103, 127 N.E.2d 832 (1955); Natelson v. A.B.L. Holding
Co., 260 N.Y. 233, 183 N.E. 373 (1932); Rapid Transit Subway Constr. Co. v. City of New York,
259 N.Y. 472, 182 N.E. 145 (1932).
In Anderson, the Court noted "[t]he fact that incorporation was desired in order to obtain lim-
ited liability does not defeat that purpose." 321 U.S. at 361.
18. "Limited liability is the rule, not the exception; and on that assumption large undertak-
ings are rested, vast enterprises are launched, and huge sums of capital attracted." Anderson v.
Abbott, 321 U.S. at 362.
19. Lowendahl v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 247 A.D. 144, 287 N.Y.S. 62, a 'd, 272 N.Y. 360,6
N.E.2d 56 (1936). In Lowendahl, the court held that a showing of fraud is necessary to disregard
the corporate entity, and explained:
Stockholders' immunity from corporate obligation is fundamental to the very concept of
the corporation as a separate legal entity. Around it the entire body of corporation law is
built. It is accepted in theory and practice and ingrained in our legal and economic
systems. Courts will not lightly disregard the corporate entity.
247 A.D. at 154, 287 N.Y.S. at 72. See A. CONARD, CORPORATzONS ON PERSPECTIVE §§ 270-277
(1976) (discussion of shareholders' liability for corporate activities); I W. FLETCHER, supra note 2,
at § 33 (corporation, not shareholder, is legally liable for its torts); H. HENN, supra note 2, at § 146
(1970) (limited liability is principal objective of incorporation); N. LATTIN, supra note 2, at §§ 11-
12 (shareholders' limited liability is general rule).
20. 306 U.S. 307 (1939).
21. Id at 322.
22. 321 U.S. 349 (1944).
23. Id at 362.
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tion to its purpose and undertaking would be a factor in denying the
shareholder's defense of limited liability.24
Courts applying New York law specifically discuss and apply well-
recognized standards for piercing the corporate veil.25 The court in
Lowendahl v. Baltimore & Ohio R. 26 held that the proponent must
establish three criteria: first, that the parent was in complete control of
the corporation at the time the cause of action arose, to the point that
the entity "had . . no separate mind, will, or existence of its own";
second, that the defendant used this control to perpetrate fraud upon
the plaintiff; and third, that the defendant's control and fraudulent use
of the corporate entity was the proximate cause of the complaint.27
Several courts applying New York law adhere to the Lowendahl crite-
24. Id No New York case has ever held that inadequate capitalization alone is sufficient to
pierce the corporate veil. Garter v. Snyder, 607 F.2d 582, 588 (2d Cir. 1979). Several federal and
New York courts have cited the inadequacy of corporate capital as a factor in the issue of whether
to disregard the corporate entity. See, e.g., Garter v. Snyder, 607 F.2d 582, 586 (2d Cir. 1979);
Brunswick Corp. v. Waxman, 459 F. Supp. 1222, 1231 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Ariate Compania
Naviera, S.A. v. Commonwealth Tankship Owners, Ltd., 310 F. Supp. 416, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1970);
Mull v. Colt Co., 31 F.R.D. 154, 163-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Port Chester Elec. Constr. Corp. v.
Atlas, 40 N.Y.2d 652, 657, 357 N.E.2d 983, 986-87 (1976); Jenkins v. Moyse, 254 N.Y. 319, 324,
172 N.E. 521, 522 (1930). Other courts refuse to evaluate the adequacy of capitalization when
asked to pierce the corporate veil. See, e.g., Fisser v. International Bank, 282 F.2d 231, 240 (2d
Cir. 1960); Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Winkler, 249 F. Supp. 771, 777-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Walkovszky
v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 419, 223 N.E.2d 6, 9 (1966). Several commentators believe that inade-
quate corporate capitalization is tantamount to fraud, and, therefore, should be sufficient to pierce
the corporate veil. See A. CONARD, supra note 19, at § 274; H. HENN, supra note 2, at § 147; N.
LATTIN, supra note 2, at § 15; Note, Liability of a Corporationfor Acts of Subsidiary or Affiliate, 71
HARV. L. REV. 1122 (1958); Comment, Allegations of Sham Incorporation Held Sufficient to Estab-
lish Single Enterprise, 32 BRoOLYN L. REV. 408 (1966).
25. Eg., Williams v. McAllister Bros., 534 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1976) (must show corporation is
"mere instrumentality" and that it is used fraudulently); Interocean Shipping Co. v. National
Shipping & Trading Corp., 523 F.2d 527 (2d Cir. 1975) (must show "complete domination" and
fraud); Fisser v. International Bank, 282 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1960) (must show that corporation has
no separate existence, that shareholders used it fraudulently, and that their control gave rise to
cause of action); In re Ira Haupt & Co., 304 F. Supp. 917 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (same); Walkovszky v.
Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 223 N.E.2d 6, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1966) (must show perversion of corpo-
rate form and fraud). Cf. Kirno Hill Corp. v. Holt, 618 F.2d 982 (2d Cir. 1980) (veil will be
pierced when corporation used to perpetrate fraud or corporate form is completely dominated);
P.S. & A. Realties, Inc. v. Lodge Gate Forest, Inc., 205 Misc. 245, 127 N.Y.2d 315 (Sup. Ct. 1954)
(complete disregard of corporate organization sufficient to find shareholders liable).
26. 247 A.D. 144, 287 N.Y.S. 62, a,'d, 272 N.Y. 360, 6 N.E.2d 56 (1936).
27. Id at 157, 287 N.Y.S. at 75. The court in Lowendahl drew on two influential, if broad,
statements of the circumstances under which the corporate entity will be disregarded and its
shareholders will be held liable for corporate torts. In the first, United States v. Milwaukee Re-
frigerator Transit Co., 142 F. 247 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1905), the court observed: "When the notion of
legal entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud or defend crime, the
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ria when plaintiffs seek to hold defendant shareholders individually lia-
ble for their corporation's torts.28 The court in Walkovszky v.
Carlton,29 however, underscored the complexity of piercing the corpo-
rate veil when it distinguished between the assertion that a corporation
is a "fragment of a larger corporate combine which actually conducts
the business" and the claim that a corporation is a "'dummy' for its
individual stockholders who are in reality carrying on the business in
their personal capacities for purely personal rather than corporate
ends."3 The court explained that in the former situation only the con-
trolling corporate entity would be held liable, while in the latter situa-
tion the shareholders would be personally liable. The Walkovsky court
held that the plaintiff need not necessarily show fraud in the organiza-
tion of the corporation in order to hold the shareholders liable. In-
stead, a showing that the shareholders routinely comingled corporate
and personal funds to accommodate their immediate and personal con-
venience would suffice to pierce the corporate veil and impose liability
on such shareholders.3' Notwithstanding the shareholder's obvious ob-
jective of minimizing their potential liability by fragmenting what was
in effect a single operating unit,32 the court found that this effort to
law will regard the corporation as an association of persons." Id at 255. In the second, Justice
Cardozo, in Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 155 N.E. 58 (1926), explained:
We say at times that the corporate entity will be ignored when the parent corporation
operates a business through a subsidiary which is characterized as an "alias" or a
"dummy." All this is well enough if the picturesqueness of the epithets does not lead us
to forget that the essential term to be defined is the act of operation. Dominion may be
so complete, interference so obtrusive, that by the general rules of agency the parent will
be a principal and the subsidiary an agent. . . . This is so, for illustration, though
agency in any proper sense is lacking, where the attempted separation between parent
and subsidiary will work a fraud upon the law.
Id at 94-95, 155 N.E. at 61.
28. E.g., Fisser v. International Bank, 282 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1960) (citing and following the
Lowendahl criteria); Brunswick Corp. v. Waxman, 459 F. Supp. 1222 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (same);
Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Winkler, 249 F. Supp. 771 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (same).
29. 18 N.Y.S.2d 414, 223 N.E.2d 6, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1966). Plaintiff Walkovszky alleged
that defendant Carlton was a stockholder of ten corporations, each owning two taxicabs insured
against liability for the minimum statutory requirement of $10,000 per vehicle. The plaintiff, in-
jured by one of the defendant's cabs, sought recovery of an amount in excess of the individual
corporation's capital. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it failed
to state a cause of action against him. Id at 416, 223 N.E.2d at 7, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 587.
30. Id at 418, 223 N.E.2d at 8, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 588.
31. Id at 420, 223 N.E.2d at 10, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 590.
32. The plaintiff alleged that the corporations were "'operated. . . as a single entity, unit
and enterprise' with regard to financing, supplies, repairs, employees and garaging. . . ." Id at
416, 223 N.E.2d at 7, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 587.
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avoid liability satisfied neither the corporate shell nor the fraud criteria
because the corporation observed the minimum statutory requirements
of form and liability insurance.33
Unlike the piercing the corporate veil doctrine, which permits the
court to disregard the corporate entity for the purpose of finding liabil-
ity, the fiduciary shield doctrine is concerned solely with the threshold
issue of jurisdiction; namely, whether it is just to assert personal juris-
diction over a nonresident corporate employee who made his only
meaningful contacts with the forum during the course of his corporate
duties. Several courts maintain that it is unjust, because the contacts
33. Id at 420, 223 N.E.2d at 10, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 590. The court explained: "The corporate
form may not be disregarded merely because the assets of the corporation, together with the
mandatory insurance coverage of the vehicle which struck the plaintiff, are insufficient to assure
him of the recovery sought." Id at 419, 223 N.E.2d at 9, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 589. The court noted
that piercing the corporate veil in this case would, in effect, substitute the court's assessment of
what constitutes adequate corporate capitalization for that of the Legislature. Id. at 419, 223
N.E.2d at 9, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 590. However, in view of the court's alternative criterion for piercing
the corporate veil, see supra note 31 and accompanying text, the plaintiff was given leave to serve
an amended complaint. Id at 421, 223 N.E.2d at 10, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 591. On appeal, the
amended complaint was held to state a valid cause of action. Walkovszky v. Carlton, 23 N.Y.2d
714, 244 N.E.2d 55, 296 N.Y.S.2d 362 (1968).
For analyses of the criteria applied in Walkovszky, see Comment, Application ofAgency or Un-
dercapitalization Theory to "Pierce Corporate Veil," 8 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 981 (1967)
(criticism of court's determination of adequate capitalization); Comment, Tort Liability of Individ-
ual Shareholders of Cab Corporations, 42 TUL. L. REv. 400 (1968) (discussion of plaintiff's theories
justifying piercing the corporate veil); 55 ILL. B.J. 881 (1967) (criticism of court's unwillingness to
examine the issue of corporate capitalization); 18 SYRAcusE L. REV. 875 (1967) (discussion of
abusive use of incorporation to avoid liability).
In Zubik v. Zubik, 384 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 983 (1968), the plaintiff
sought to pierce the veil of the defendant's undercapitalized corporation in order to hold its share-
holders liable in tort for his injuries. There was evidence that the defendant had maintained a
separate corporate existence. Id at 272. The court refused to pierce, reasoning that the case of the
injured tort claimant is distinguishable from that of the defrauded creditor: "the corporate form
itself works no fraud on a person harmed in an accident who has never elected to deal with the
corporation." Id at 273.
The California Supreme Court, however, in Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal. 2d 576, 364 P.2d 473,
15 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1961), held that a corporate officer and equitable owner of a swimming pool
corporation whose capital was "trifling compared with the business to be done and the risks of
loss" could be held liable for the corporation's torts. The court found that inadequate capitaliza-
tion and active participation in the conduct of corporate business were sufficient to allow the court
to "disregard the corporate entity." Id at 580, 364 P.2d at 475, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 643. As support
for its opinion, the court relied upon Automotriz Del Golfo de California, S.A. de C.V. v. Resnick,
47 Cal. 2d 792, 306 P.2d 1 (1957), in which it held that in an action on a corporate debt, inade-
quate capitalization was a factor to be considered in determining that the shareholders had not
maintained a corporate entity and thus were personally liable for the corporation's obligations.
Id at 796-97, 306 P.2d at 4.
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that would satisfy personal jurisdiction requirements 34 benefitted the
corporation and not the individual.35 These courts will not require
nonresident defendants to undergo the hardship of defending a suit in
34. See supra notes 4 & 11.
35. See, e.g., Lehigh Valley Indus. v. Birenbaum, 527 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1975) (presence in
forum benefitted corporation, not individual); Wilshire Oil Co. v. Rifle, 409 F.2d 1277 (10th Cir.
1969) (corporate activities not personal acts and therefore do not satisfy the "transacting business"
criteria for finding personal jurisdiction); Cawley v. Bloch, 544 F. Supp. 133 (D. Md. 1982) (even
tortious contacts as corporate representative insufficient to predicate personal jurisdiction); State
Sec. Ins. Co. v. Frank B. Hall & Co., 530 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (fiduciary shield principles
reflect recognition jurisdiction must comport "with fair play and substantial justice"); Bulova
Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co., 508 F. Supp. 1322 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (same); Grove Press, Inc. v,
Central Intelligence Agency, 483 F. Supp. 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rey'd on other grounds sub nom.
Grove Press, Inc. v. Angelton, 649 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1981) (unfair to subject individual to jurisdic-
tion when employer derived primary benefit from acts in forum); Louis Marx & Co. v. Fuji Seiko
Co., 453 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (corporate officer acting on corporate business in jurisdic-
tion not amenable to suit in personal capacity); Idaho Potato Comm'n v. Washington Potato
Comm'n, 410 F. Supp. 171 (D. Idaho 1975) (same); Hare v. Family Publications Serv., 342 F.
Supp. 678 (D. Md. 1972) (jurisdiction over corporate employees and officers not predicated upon
jurisdiction over corporation itself); Fashion Two Twenty, Inc. v. Steinberg, 339 F. Supp. 836
(E.D.N.Y. 1971) (same); Path Instruments Int'l Corp. v. Ashi Optical Co., 312 F. Supp. 805
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (New York long-arm not satisfied by conduct undertaken solely for corporation);
Willner v. Thompson, 285 F. Supp. 394 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (same); Schenin v. Micro Copper Corp.,
272 F. Supp. 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) ("transacting business" requirement not satisfied by activities
undertaken on behalf of corporation); Unicon Management Corp. v. Koppers Co., 250 F. Supp.
850 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (absence of wrongdoing on part of defendants in their own individual capac-
ity bars assertion of personal jurisdiction); Hurleton Whittier, Inc. v. Barda, 82 Ill. App. 3d 443,
422 N.E.2d 840 (1980) (personal jurisdiction criteria not satisfied by corporate representative's
activities in forum); Umans v. PWP Servs., Inc., 50 Md. App. 414, 439 A.2d 21 (1982) ("universal"
rule that contacts by corporate representative insufficient to satisfy personal jurisdiction criteria);
Yardis Corp. v. Cirami, 76 Misc. 2d 793, 351 N.Y.S.2d 586 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974) (same); LeVine v.
Isoserve, Inc., 70 Misc. 2d 747, 334 N.Y.S.2d 796 (N.Y. Supp. Ct. 1972) (showing that defendant
acted as corporate officer in forum insufficient to predicate personal jurisdiction); Van Kleeck
Creamery, Inc. v. Western Frozen Prods. Co., 24 Utah 2d 63, 465 P.2d 544 (1970) (full faith and
credit to foreign judgment denied; improper assertion of personal jurisdiction over nonresident
corporate officer). But see Chancellor v. Lawrence, 501 F. Supp. 997 (N.D. Il. 1980) (nonresident
corporate employees subject to personal jurisdiction where corporation's revenue, derived through
activities in forum paid share of defendants' compensation, thus conferring benefit on defendants);
Merkel Assocs., Inc. v. Bellofram Corp., 457 F. Supp. 612 (W.D.N.Y. 1977) (fiduciary shield un-
available to nonresident individuals who commit business torts on behalf of corporate employers).
See generally 3A W. FLETCHER, supra note 2, at § 1296.1 (general rules of jurisdiction over non-
resident corporate fiduciaries).
At least one commentator is unimpressed with the court's search for fairness through the appli-
cation of the fiduciary shield doctrine. As support for his position that the doctrine should be
abandoned, Professor Sponsler cites the legitimate concerns of the state for anyone who enters its
territory, the fact that employees do receive compensation for their activity in the forum state, and
the likelihood both that the corporation indemnifies its employees' defense and liability judgment,
and that the party seeking to defeat jurisdiction will probably eventually appear in the forum's
courts as a witness in a similar suit against the corporation. Sponsler, supra note 3, at 364-65.
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an alien forum,3 6 notwithstanding the defendants' possible liability for
the torts alleged.37
Rene Boas & Associates v. Vernier 38 is generally cited as the first case
to apply the fiduciary shield doctrine. 39  The Boas court refused to ex-
tend its jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant whose contacts with
the forum were entirely corporate.4 The court, however, cited as pre-
36. See supra note 11.
37. A corporate officer or employee who commits a tort in the course of his corporate activity
may be held individually liable for the harm caused by a third party. Polyglycoat Corp. v. C.P.C.
Distrib., 534 F. Supp. (S.D.N.Y. 1982). See, e.g., Laska v. Harris, 215 N.Y. 554, 109 N.E. 599
(1915) (agent personally liable to plaintiff for false and fraudulent representations made on behalf
of principal); LaLumia v. Schwartz, 23 A.D.2d 668, 257 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1965) (same); Mendelson v.
Boettger, 257 A.D. 167, 12 N.Y.S.2d 671 (1939) (individual directors purporting to act on behalf of
corporation liable to plaintiff for conversion); Debobes v. Butterfly, 210 A.D. 50, 205 N.Y.S. 170
(1924) (same). Accord Natural Resources, Inc. v. Wineberg, 349 F.2d 685 (9th Cir.) (corporate
officer responsible for torts committed in the course of his corporate activities), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 1010 (1965); Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co., 24 Cal. 3d 773, 598 P.2d 45, 157 Cal. Rptr. 392
(1979) (directors and officers of corporation personally liable if they directly order, authorize, or
participate in tortious conduct). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 354 (1957)
(agent's liability for injury to third parties caused by negligence in fulfilling duty to principal);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965) (agent liable to third parties for negligent per-
formance of undertaking to render services to principal); 3A W. FLETCHER, supra note 2, at § 990
(officers and director personally liable for injury to third persons harmed in the course of business
on a theory of misfeasance); id § 1143 (corporate officer or agent personally liable for damages
caused by fraud or deceit to persons directly injured thereby).
38. 22 A.D.2d 561, 257 N.Y.S.2d 487 (1965).
39. Sponsler, supra note 3, at 352. In two earlier cases, Maternity Trousseau, Inc. v. Mater-
nity Mart of Baltimore, 196 F. Supp. 456 (D. Md. 1961) and Odell v. Signer, 169 So. 2d 851 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1964), the courts sustained in personam jurisdiction notwithstanding the defend-
ants' fiduciary shield arguments. The court in Maternity Trousseau asserted jurisdiction over a
nonresident corporate officer based on its interpretation of Maryland's long-arm statute. The
court's dicta, however, suggests that considerations of liability prompted the determination. 196
F. Supp. at 457-5 8. In Odell, the court citing Maternity Trousseau, reasoned that the defendant's
personal liability for torts committed within the scope of employment established contacts suffi-
cient to subject the defendant to personal jurisdiction. 169 So. 2d at 854. Similar reasoning has
led one court to deny jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. In Magidow v. Coronado Cattle
Co., 19 Ariz. App. 38, 41, 504 P.2d 961, 964 (1972), the court refused to assert personal jurisdiction
over two nonresident individuals because the plaintiff failed to show that the defendants had
done, or had failed to do, any act which would give rise to personal liability.
The court in Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d
68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1969), however, emphasized that in construing the scope of New York's long-
arm statute, the court is:
concerned solely with the problem of the court's jurisdiction over the person of a non-
resident defendant and not with the question of his ultimate liability to a particular
plaintiff; that issue is to be considered only after it is decided, on the basis of section 302,
that the defendant is subject to. . . in personam jurisdiction. ...
Id at 460, 209 N.E.2d at 77, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 21.
40. 22 A.D.2d at 563, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 490.
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cedent for its denial of jurisdiction two cases in which the courts re-
fused to pierce the corporate veil.4 1 Notwithstanding this ambiguous
precedent, the Second Circuit, in United States v. Montreal Trust Co. ,42
acknowledged the fiduciary shield doctrine but found it inapplicable to
the facts of the case.43 The court found that the defendant's decedent
had breached his fiduciary duty by diverting corporate funds during
the course of his activities in New York.44 The court reasoned that
because the shield's rationale is to protect the corporate fiduciary from
foreign jurisdiction predicated on activity undertaken to benefit the
corporation, the defendant's diversion of corporate funds constituted
personal business and was, therefore, a meaningful, personal contact
with the forum sufficient to satisfy the criteria for asserting personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident.45 Similarly, in Lehigh Valley Industries,
Inc. v. Birenbaum ,46 the Second Circuit considered the plaintiffs' alle-
gations that the defendants had violated their corporate fiduciary re-
sponsibilities and were thus subject to jurisdiction in the forum
notwithstanding the fiduciary shield doctrine.47 The court held that in
41. Id (citing Savoy Record Co. v. Cardinal Export Co., 15 N.Y.S.2d 1, 203 N.E.2d 206, 254
N.Y.2d 521 (1964) (agent signing contract on behalf of principal not personally liable for breach
of the contract), and Salzman Sign Co. v. Beck, 10 N.Y.2d 63, 176 N.E.2d 74, 217 N.Y.S.2d 55
(196 1) (corporate officer signing contract on behalf of corporation will not bind officer individu-
ally in the absence of explicit evidence of intent)).
42. 358 F.2d 239 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 919 (1966).
43. Id at 243 (citing Rene Boas & Assocs. v. Vernier, 22 A.D.2d 561, 257 N.Y.S.2d 487
(1965)). The first use of the term "fiduciary shield" appears in Montreal Trust.
44. The court reasoned:
Klein could not have been acting in his role as a corporate officer when he allegedly
directed a course of payments to his relatives and friends. It would be ironic, indeed, if
the very corporations whose funds Klein is charged with diverting were to supply him
with a shield against suit for tax liability allegedly incurred in connection with this pur-
ported breach of his fiduciary duty.
Id The decedent Klein never personally entered New York in connection with the cause of ac-
tion. He lived in Canada and worked through individuals in New York. The court determined
that these individuals were Klein's agents for the purpose of diverting funds to his designees.
Thus, their activities could form the basis for the assertion of personal jurisdiction over him. 1d
at 244.
45. Id at 243-44. Citing Montreal Trust, the court in Krause v. Hauser, 272 F. Supp. 549
(E.D.N.Y. 1966), held that conduct within New York that was in violation of a fiduciary duty and
that furthered the defendant's individual interests constituted the transaction of personal business
for purposes of applying § 302(a)(1). Id at 552. Accord Wilshire Oil Co. v. Rifle, 409 F.2d 1277
(10th Cir. 1969) (allegation that acts perpetrated in violation of agent's fiduciary duty militates
against use of fiduciary shield); Topik v. Catalyst Research Corp., 339 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Md.
1972) (alleged breach of a fiduciary duty is recognized exception to fiduciary shield doctrine).
46. 527 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1975).
47. Id at 92-93.
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the absence of any facts which would justify the plaintiffs' allegations,
the shield barred the assertion of personal jurisdiction.48 Significantly,
the court noted that the plaintiffs had failed to establish that the de-
fendants manipulated the corporate entity for fraudulent or personal
ends.49
Several courts have suggested that the fiduciary shield would be un-
available to a nonresident defendant who used his corporation as an
alter ego.5" In Bulova Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co. ,5 the court stated
48. Id at 93-94.
49. Id at 93. The plaintiffs in Lehigh also attempted to establish jurisdiction over the de-
fendants through § 302(a)(2), which permits the assertion of personal jurisdiction over a nonresi-
dent who commits a tortious act within the state. Id at 92. The plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants had wrongfully appropriated a business opportunity that belonged to them. The court
found that the defendant had committed the allegedly tortious conduct in the forum while acting
in his capacity as a corporate officer, and therefore refused to assert jurisdiction. However, the
court indicated that the plaintiffs' theory of personal jurisdiction under § 302(a)(2) would have
been successful had they alleged that the defendants disregarded their responsibility to the corpo-
ration and actually acted in their own interest. Id at 92-93. If the plaintiffs had been able to do so
successfully, however, they would have satisfied the § 302(a)(1) requirement that nonresident de-
fendants "transact business" in the forum.
50. See, e.g., Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Auth. v. Almogy, 510 F. Supp. 873, 876
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (network of corporations forming defendant's alter ego will not raise fiduciary
shield); Warren v. Dynamics Health Equip. Mfg. Co., 483 F. Supp. 788, 793 (M.D. Tenn. 1980)
(jurisdiction denied because plaintiff did not offer evidence to support contention that defendant
was corporate alter ego); Testa v. Janssen, 482 F. Supp. 1195, 1199 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (jurisdiction
denied because plaintiffs did not contend defendant was alter ego of corporation); Lamar v. Amer-
ican Basketball Ass'n., 468 F. Supp. 1198, 1203 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (must be inference that corpora-
tion is doing business as defendant's alter ego); Quinn v. Bowmar Publishing Co., 445 F. Supp.
780, 786 (D. Md. 1978) (fiduciary shield excepted where corporation is facade for defendant's
individual activities); Willner v. Thompson, 285 F. Supp. 394, 397 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (jurisdiction
not asserted without allegation that corporation is defendant's alter ego); Magidow v. Coronado
Cattle Co., 19 Ariz. App. 38, 42, 504 P.2d 961, 965 (1972) (fiduciary shield intact as plaintiffs did
not support alter ego allegation with facts). See also Dudley v. Smith, 504 F.2d 979, 982-83 (5th
Cir. 1974) (stockholder may be in privity with his corporation such that judgment against latter is
res judicata as to former if two are found to be alter egos). But see Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal. 2d
576, 364 P.2d 473, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1961) (although the court was willing to pierce the corporate
veil and hold the corporate secretary-director liable for corporate tort, the judgment was not bind-
ing upon him unless he controlled litigation leading to judgment). Cf. Andrulonis v. United
States, 526 F. Supp. 183, 187 (N.D.N.Y. 1981) (systematic activities of subsidiary or agent in New
York may subject foreign principal to personal jurisdiction); Bulova Watch Co. v. K. Hattori &
Co., 508 F. Supp. 1322, 1334 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (jurisdictional balancing assessing fairness of assert-
ing jurisdiction over nonresident requires examination of foreign parent-local subsidiary relation-
ship); Finance Co. of Am. v. Bankamerica Corp., 493 F. Supp. 895, 903-09 (D. Md. 1980)
(personal jurisdiction asserted over nonresident corporate principal who substantially controls
subsidiary in forum); Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Superior Oil Co., 460 F. Supp. 483, 490 (D.
Kan. 1978) (long-arm statute authorizes jurisdiction over nonresident corporation owning affili-
ated corporation that committed acts at direction of or for benefit of principal in forum). But Sf
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in dictum what Montreal Trust52 and Lehigh Valley Industries53 im-
plied; namely, that the equitable purpose of the fiduciary shield doc-
trine would be subverted by its application to nonresident defendants
who had used the corporate form for personal benefit.14 Three Mary-
land courts" applied the Bulova dictum and disregarded the fiduciary
shield. In one case the defendant had not maintained the corporate
form. 6 In another, the defendant's partnership had established the
corporation to hold title to real estate for the partnership's benefit.5 7 In
the third, the defendant had created and dominated his corporation for
Ferrante Equip. Co. v. Lasker-Goldman Corp., 26 N.Y.2d 280, 283, 258 N.E.2d 202, 204, 309
N.Y.S. 913, 916 (1970) (mere status as controlling stockholder insufficient to justify piercing cor-
porate veil to assert jurisdiction without additional alter ego showing). See generally 3A W.
FLETCHER, supra note 2, at § 1296.1 (personal jurisdiction generally not available over nonresi-
dent directors, officers, or agents acting in forum); 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 4, at
§ 1069 (methods of obtaining jurisdiction over parent corporation through subsidiary's acts in
forum).
51. 508 F. Supp. 1322 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
52. 358 F.2d 239 (2d Cir. 1966). See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
53. 527 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1975). See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
54. 508 F. Supp. at 1348. The court reasoned:
As the term "fiduciary shield" suggests, this is an equitable doctrine. It should be fol-
lowed not with mechanically [sic] but with a sound exercise of discretion. If, for exam-
ple, the parent lacked sufficient assets to respond or if it were a shell utilized by an
individual defendant for his own benefit, the balance of fairness might be tipped and
jurisdiction over the individual might lie.
Id
55. Holfield v. Power Chem. Corp., 382 F. Supp. 388 (D. Md. 1974); Groom v. Margulies,
257 Md. 691, 265 A.2d 249 (1970); Harris v. Arlen Properties, Inc., 256 Md. 185, 260 A.2d 22
(1969).
56. Groom v. Margulies, 257 Md. 691,703, 265 A.2d 249, 254-55 (1970). In Groom, the court
distinguished the issue ofjurisdiction from that of liability. It rejected the nonresident defendant's
argument that because the defendant could not be held personally liable for his corporation's torts
in the forum, the court could not assert personal jurisdiction over him. The court explained that
the liability defense "goes to the merits of the case, not to the power of the court to make the
adjudication." Id at 703-04, 265 A.2d at 255.
Three weeks after the Second Circuit decided Marine Midland, the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals held that personal jurisdiction was properly exercised over a nonresident defendant
whose only contacts with the forum were the activities of his corporate alter ego. Feldman v.
Magnetix Corp., 50 Md. App. 308, 437 A.2d 895 (1981). The court was careful to note, however,
that its holding did not "intimate anything with respect to a forum state's 'Long Arm' inpersonam
jurisdiction over an individual who is, as an agent, just one small cog in the machinery under a
large and multifaceted corporate entity." 50 Md. App. at 312, n.2, 437 A.2d at 897 n.2. Cf. Umans
v. PWP Servs., Inc., 50 Md. App. 414, 421, 439 A.2d 21, 25 (1982) (no jurisdiction where Groom
and Feldman alter ego exception to fiduciary shield was not indicated by facts of case).
57. Harris v. Arlen Properties, Inc., 256 Md. 185, 260 A.2d 22 (1969). The court explained
that jurisdiction over the nonresident partnership will lie when the partnership created the corpo-
ration and totally controlled activity in the forum solely to accomplish its own objectives.
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the sole purpose of carrying out his marketing plans."
There is a minority view which holds that a corporate fiduciary's tor-
tious activity within the forum defeats the fiduciary shield and forms
the basis for the assertion of personal jurisdiction. 9  In MerkelAssoci-
ates, Inc. v. Bellofram Corp. ,0 the court in dictum stated that such an
assertion of personal jurisdiction would not conflict with the equitable
purpose of the shield.6 The court noted that a corporation is presumed
to be law-abiding. Because it would not authorize its employees to
commit a tort, the individual employee who commits torts in the forum
does so on his own behalf, thus satisfying the criteria for asserting per-
sonal jurisdiction.6" Several courts have criticized this position as both
largely unprecedented and unfair when the tort with which the individ-
58. Holfield v. Power Chem. Co., 382 F. Supp. 388 (D. Md. 1974). The defendant was presi-
dent, member of the board and majority stockholder in the corporation. The court's finding of an
"'unmistakable identity of interest" between the defendant and the corporation, the Harris prece-
dent, and the significant forum state's interests at issue convinced the court to disregard the fiduci-
ary shield doctrine. Id at 394.
Although the cases cited supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text interpret Maryland's long-
arm statute, CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 6.103 (1980), they should also serve as authority for courts
interpreting New York's long-arm statute. Maryland's long-arm was modeled after the UNIF.
INTERSTATE & INT'L PROCEDURE ACT § 1.03, 13 U.L.A. 466 (1980). Carter v. Massey, 436 F.
Supp. 29 (D. Md. 1977). New York's § 302(a) was modeled after Illinois' long-arm statute, ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (1956). New York Advisory Comm. Rep. (N.Y. Legis. Doc., 1958, No.
13). N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 302 (Consol. 1978). Illinois' long-arm was the model for the UNIF.
INTERSTATE & INT'L PROCEDURE ACT, 13 U.L.A. 467 (1980). Both New York and Maryland
limit their in personam jurisdiction by requiring that nonresident defendants' minimum contacts
relate to the cause of action in the suit.
59. See, e.g., In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litig., 525 F. Supp. 1265, 1270 (D. Md.
1981) (fiduciary shield inapplicable where corporate officer has allegedly committed personal or
business tort within forum); Donner v. Tams-Witmark Music Library, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1229,
1234 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (corporate officer's business tort in forum sufficient to establish personal
jurisdiction); Merkel Assocs., Inc. v. Bellofram Corp., 437 F. Supp. 612 (W.D.N.Y. 1977) (dictum)
(fiduciary shield unavailable to individuals who commit business torts on behalf of their corporate
employers); Oxmans' Erwin Meat Co. v. Blacketer, 86 Wisc. 2d 683, 692, 273 N.W.2d 285, 289
(1978) (corporate agent not shielded from personal jurisdiction if he, as agent of corporation,
commits tort in forum). Cf. Grove Press, Inc. v. Central Intelligence Agency, 483 F. Supp. 132,
135 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (tortious acts of government officers will predicate an assertion of personal
jurisdiction under § 302(a)(2)), rey'don other grounds sub. nom. Grove Press, Inc. v. Angleton, 649
F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1981).
60. 437 F. Supp. 612 (W.D.N.Y. 1977).
61. Id at 618-19. The court specifically applied the facts of the case to § 302(a)(2), which
authorizes jurisdiction over nonresident individuals who commit tortious acts in the state. The
court refused to assert jurisdiction over the defendants because the plaintiffs failed to allege facts
that would indicate that the defendants had committed torts in New York. Id at 620.
62. Id at 619.
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ual is charged is also directly attributable to his corporate employer.6 3
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in Marine Midland Bank, N.A.
v. Miller,' held that the fiduciary shield doctrine will not defeat the
assertion of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who
acts in the forum through a corporate alter ego.6 5 The court distin-
guished the issue of shareholder liability for torts committed by an in-
dividual acting in a corporate capacity from the issue of amenability to
personal jurisdiction under the New York long-arm statute predicated
solely on those acts. 66 Although misfeasance in the forum may subject
the corporate officer or employee to liability,67 it does not necessarily
support the assertion of personal jurisdiction. The fiduciary shield's
purpose, the court explained, is to prevent the unfair situation of sub-
jecting a nonresident defendant to personal jurisdiction predicated
solely on acts he undertook for the benefit of his employer.68
The court limited the fiduciary shield to equitable applications, with
fairness as the ultimate test of appropriateness.6 9 Relying on its deci-
sion in Montreal Trust,70 the court found that the activities raising the
shield were actually undertaken for the corporation's benefit and not
63. See, e.g., Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. Miller, 664 F.2d 899, 902 (2d Cir. 1981) (Merkel
opinion not prevailing view; alleged tort of negligent misrepresentation consisted merely of sup-
port for corporate misstatements); Cawley v. Bloch, 544 F. Supp. 133, 136 (D. Md. 1982) (even
tortious acts committed on behalf of corporation do not subject individual to personal jurisdic-
tion); State Sec. Ins. Co. v. Frank B. Hall & Co., 530 F. Supp. 94, 97 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (Merkel
minority view; Illinois follows majority as expressed in Marine Midland); Bulova Watch Co. v. K.
Hattori & Co., 508 F. Supp. 1322, 1347 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (jurisdiction over nonresident defeated
because defendants were acting as agents of a corporation when they committed tort); Fashion
Two Twenty, Inc. v. Steinberg, 339 F. Supp. 836, 841-42 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (same).
64. 664 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1981).
65. Id at 903-04. In Marine Midland Bank, N.A., the plaintiff argued that jurisdiction over
Miller could be predicated upon his tortious activity in the forum, as authorized by § 302(a)(2).
Brief for Appellant at 8-19, Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. Miller, 664 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1981).
The court, in holding that § 302(a) was the appropriate authority, refused to assert jurisdiction
under § 302(a)(2). Id at 902-03. The court rejected the Merkel dictum, explaining that it was the
minority view and that "given the rationale for the fiduciary shield doctrine. . . it is obvious that
the doctrine should be applied where the tort alleged is negligent misrepresentation and the state-
ments attributed to the corporate agent consisted of no more than confirmations and reiterations
of the corporation's own statements." Id at 902-03.
66. Id at 903.
67. See supra note 37.
68. 664 F.2d at 902.
69. Id at 903.




for the individual's advantage.7 The court observed that it had sug-
gested in Lehigh Valley Industries,72 that the fiduciary shield doctrine
would not protect a nonresident corporate fiduciary from an assertion
of personal jurisdiction if the facts of the case indicate that he acted in
the forum for his own benefit or to the detriment of the corporation.
The court rejected the Merkel dictum and declined to predicate juris-
diction upon the plaintifts allegations that the defendant had commit-
ted a tort in the forum. The court reasoned that the tortious activity
alleged was indistinguishable from the corporate business that
prompted defendant's presence in the forum.7 3
To determine whether the fiduciary shield should preclude jurisdic-
tion, the court found it necessary to examine not only the loyalty of the
employee to his employer, but also the relationship between the tWo.
7 4
The court cited Bulova Watch,75 in which Judge Weinstein found that a
court should assert jurisdiction over an individual stockholder if he un-
dercapitalized the corporation or used the corporate form as a shell for
his own benefit. The court explained that the criteria for applying the
fiduciary shield to defeat personal jurisidiction begins and ends with an
examination of the corporate form. If the corporation functions merely
as a shell for its owners, then the corporate activity accrues to their own
benefit and it is equitable to predicate personal jurisdiction upon this
activity.76 The showing that the corporate form was used to commit
fraud, which a number of courts have found necessary to pierce the
corporate veil to fix liability upon shareholders,77 is irrelevant to the
assertion of personal jurisdiction over one of the corporation's
fiduciaries. The court held that a prima facie showing that the corpora-
tion is a shell for the defendant is sufficient to defeat, at least tempora-
rily, a pretrial motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.78
The Second Circuit, in Marine Midland, clearly distinguished the is-
sue of asserting personal jurisdiction over nonresident corporate
71. 664 F.2d at 903.
72. 257 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1975). See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
73. 664 F.2d at 903.
74. Id at 902-03. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
75. 508 F. Supp. 1322 (E.D.N.Y. 1981). See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
76. 664 F.2d at 903,
77. Id See supra notes 19-27 and accompanying text. But see notes 29-33 and accompany-
ing text (fraud not necessarily required to pierce corporate veil to hold dominating shareholder
liable for corporate torts).
78. 664 F.2d at 904.
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fiduciaries from the issue of holding shareholders liable for torts com-
mitted through the corporation's agents.79 By carefully delineating the
test for piercing the corporate veil, and then contrasting it with the
standard for applying the fiduciary shield doctrine,8 the court both
reestablished the integrity of the fiduciary shield doctrine and facili-
tated the assertion of personal jurisdiction over nonresident corporate
fiduciaries by withholding the shield's protection from those fiduciaries
who use the corporation as an alter ego. Shielding from jurisdiction
nonresident corporate fiduciaries who were the primary beneficiaries of
the business that was conducted in the forum through a corporation
which had no independent existence debases the equitable purpose of
the doctrine.8 Additionally, by rejecting the plaintiff's arguments that
jurisdiction could be predicated on the defendant's alleged tortious ac-
tivity in the forum, 8z the court recognized the true purpose of the
fiduciary shield doctrine. Nonresident corporate officers, directors, and
employees whose activities benefit only the corporation and subject the
corporation to jurisdiction and liability, should not have to undergo the
hardship of defending themselves against allegations of misfeasance in
an alien forum.83 Such parties potentially would have been subject to
personal jurisdiction had the court predicated jurisdiction over Miller
upon his alleged tortious activity, thereby gutting the equitable nature
of the fiduciary shield doctrine. Furthermore, underlying the court's
opinion is the recognition that the theory of in personam jurisdiction
pertains to the legal and social benefits the defendant enjoys when he
transacts business in the forum.84 The lower court's requirement of an
79. Id at 903.
80. Id
81. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
82. 664 F.2d at 902-03. See supra notes 63 & 65. In dismissing the plaintiffs Merkel based
arguments in favor of asserting personal jurisdiction, the court may have limited further the
fiduciary shield doctrine's applicability. Arguably, the court's dicta suggests that only those cor-
porate agents whose torts consist of carrying out tortious activity per the corporation's intention
shall be shielded from assertions of personal jurisdiction.
83. See supra notes 37, 63 & 65.
84. See supra notes 5 & 11.
By preserving, rather than disregarding, the fiduciary shield doctrine, the Second Circuit's anal-
ysis may reflect a perceptive reading of the Supreme Court's several opinions relating to personal
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. The Second Circuit's emphasis on who actually benefits
from the activity in the forum parallels the Supreme Court's concern that the minimum contacts
with the state which would support an assertion of personal jurisdiction over the defendant were
sufficient to satisfy "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." In other words, sub-




additional showing of fraud,85 which the Second Circuit found neces-
sary to pierce the corporate veil,86 bears no relationship to the fact that
the defendant was the chief beneficiary of his alter ego's activities in the
forum.
8 7
The Marine Midland court faced an unusual fact situation. Defend-
ant Miller appeared to preserve the corporate form, albeit as a shell.88
There was no showing, as in Montreal Trust, that he had breached his
fiduciary obligation to the corporation. Therefore, the court shifted its
inquiry from the benefits the corporation received from the defendant
employee's activities in the forum, to the identity of those who con-
trolled and benefitted from those activities. The court's approach was
logical and supported by dicta in other decisions.89 Marine Midland
will be persuasive precedent for courts faced with the challenge of de-
feating an inequitable application of the fiduciary shield doctrine."°
The assertion of personal jurisdiction over the nonresident must be
fair to both the defendant and the plaintiff. The unwitting plaintiff
should not be forced to pursue his suit in a distant forum because de-
fendant transacted his business under a corporate name. The defend-
ant did not find it onerous to transact what appeared to be his own
business in the forum. He therefore availed himself of the forum's
privileges and responsibilities. The rationale supporting a finding of in
out of activity undertaken by him but unrelated to his personal interest arguably does not comport
with "fair play and substantial justice." See Iowa ex rel Miller v. Internal Energy Management
Corp., 324 N.W.2d 707, 711 (Iowa 1982) (court states in dictum that fiduciary shield doctrine is a
constitutional due process limitation on jurisdiction). But see supra notes II & 14.
85. 512 F. Supp. 602, 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
86. See supra notes 20-32 and accompanying text.
87. 664 F.2d at 903.
88. Id at 902.
Unfortunately, nowhere in the opinion does the court explicitly state what must be pleaded and
proved to make a prima facie showing that a corporation is actually a "shell" or "alter ego." It
appears the court will examine the scheme of ownership of the corporation, the adequacy of its
capitalization in relation to the scope of its activities, and the method in which its funds are main-
tained and disbursed. Id at 904. Apparently, the court will look for personal domination of the
corporation to the extent that the corporation has no identity apart from the fiduciary controlling
it. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
90. In Cawley v. Bloch, 544 F. Supp. 133 (S.D. Md. 1982), the court cited Marine Midland as
dispositive of the Merkel dicta. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. Similarly, the court in
Sharp Elecs. Corp. v. Hayman Cash Register Co., 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 64,803 (D.N.J.
May 20, 1982), refused to assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident fiduciary defendant be-
cause the facts alleged did not satisfy the alter ego fiduciary shield exception established in Marine
Midland.
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personam jurisdiction is satisfied and the fiduciary shield remains in-
tact to protect those it was intended to shield. Accordingly, it was just
that the forum subjected him to its jurisdiction.
K.M. K.
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